The World Trade Center had the two tallest buildings in New York City, iconic fixtures on the skyline for nearly 40 years. Reaching more than 1,300 feet into the sky, the 110-story twin buildings—the North Tower, known as One World Trade, and the South Tower, known as Two World Trade—anchored a 16-acre complex of seven buildings in the heart of Lower Manhattan’s financial sector. Nestled between them was Three World Trade, which held a 22-story Marriott Hotel. Four other buildings surrounded the site: Four World Trade, a nine-story building occupied primarily by Deutsche Bank; Five World Trade, also a nine-story office building; Six World Trade, an eight-story building occupied by the U.S. Customs House for New York and other government agencies; and Seven World Trade, a 47-story building that included New York’s Office of Emergency Management. Beneath the complex was a shopping mall that housed eateries and about 80 retail stores.
The World Trade Center site was owned by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, a governmental agency created in 1921 that also oversees New York’s airports—LaGuardia, Kennedy, and Newark—the Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York City, the PATH commuter train system, as well as the tunnels and bridges between the two states. It has its own Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), which in 2001 consisted of 1,331 officers, all of whom were cross-trained in basic firefighting. In July 2001, real estate mogul Larry Silverstein purchased the lease for World Trade Center buildings One, Two, Four, and Five.
As Tuesday, September 11, 2001, began, the 50,000 people who worked across the World Trade Center complex began to arrive. Each floor of the North and South Towers represented a full acre of office space. On an average day, 70,000 visitors would pass through for meetings, shopping, a meal at the Windows on the World restaurant atop the North Tower, or to soak in views from the public observation deck atop the South Tower. For all of them, it was just another morning.
Dan Potter, firefighter, Ladder 10, FDNY: My wife worked at One World Trade Center, and she had a business engagement with other bosses on the 81st floor. I made her an asparagus omelet for breakfast. Then she went to walk to work.
Jean Potter, Bank of America, North Tower, 81st floor: I would leave the house every day and say to him the last line of this movie, The Story of Christ: “Just remember, Jesus said I am always with you.” That’s how I would leave him in the morning as I would go to work.
Dan Potter: Then I would begin my day. I was studying for the lieutenant promotion exam coming up in October. I walked across to the Trade Center—I had a pickup parked at the bottom of Two World Trade Center. We had spaces down there, provided for the firefighters assigned to Ten House [the station near the Towers that housed Ladder 10 and Engine 10].
Jared Kotz, Risk Waters Group, New York City: I was an employee of Risk Waters Group, which was holding the technology conference at Windows on the World on September 11th. My job that morning was to make sure all of our publications were unloaded and put on display racks.
William Jimeno, officer, PAPD: It was a normal routine day. We got a little coffee, went out on post, and I remember standing, looking at the entrance of the bus terminal at 42nd and Eighth Avenue—what we call “the rush.” The rush is where everybody from New Jersey, Connecticut, other parts of New York take buses into the terminal. It’s a steady flow of thousands of people coming into Midtown Manhattan.
Michael Lomonaco, executive chef, Windows on the World, North Tower, 106th floor: My usual hours were from 8:30 in the morning until 10:00, 10:30 at night. That morning my wife and I got up a little bit early because we were voting in the primaries. There was no one at the polls. It wasn’t that busy.
My reading glasses were in need of repair. When I hit the street in front of Tower Two, I thought, Wow, it’s really early. It’s not even 8:15. I bet I can get the optometrist to see me, and I can have my glasses this afternoon. I made a detour to the Trade Center Concourse level and I went straight for LensCrafters. A minute later, I was standing at the counter, asking, “I need new lenses for my glasses.”
Judith Wein, senior vice president, Aon Corporation, South Tower, 103rd floor: My husband and I, we got off the bus right when it got to Pearl and Frankfort. We would walk up the block, following the Brooklyn Bridge coming down, and at City Hall Park we would say good-bye. He would go to his place, and I would walk down to the Trade Center. The weather was so nice. You had a really happy feeling. I turned and smiled to him. He said later that stuck in his mind, because for hours he didn’t know whether I was alive or not.
Vanessa Lawrence, artist, North Tower, 91st floor: I was hesitant to go make this phone call to my friend Amelia, who was coming to see the studio. I thought, I need a break. About 8:30, I went down. You came down the elevator and then through a door to use the pay phone. I called her. I went and got a juice. Coming back, one of the security guards started chatting to me: “How are you doing?” I’m like, “Good. Good.” I was so anxious to get back up and paint. It’s like, “Got to go,” and walked on the elevator, went up.
Richard Eichen, consultant, Pass Consulting Group, North Tower, 90th floor: You got in the elevators and went up to the 78th floor, the Sky Lobby. Then you had to go to another elevator bank, and then get up to the 90th floor. The elevator going up to 78 was so fast you could actually feel it, and your ears would pop.
David Kravette, bond broker, Cantor Fitzgerald, North Tower: The offices were on the 105th floor. It took about five, ten minutes just to go upstairs—two elevator rides up. But when you got up top the views were spectacular. You could see the world.
Jared Kotz: I got up to the 106th floor and was greeted by some of my colleagues. Paul Bristow walked up to me and said, “Jared, I was here early. I saw the magazines, so I pulled them out of the boxes and set them up on a display rack. Is this what you wanted?” I said, “Yeah, this is great! Paul, thanks very much.” If Paul hadn’t been there early and set up the magazines, I probably would have still been there when the plane hit. Then I realized of all the things that had arrived, we were missing one of our titles. I offered to go back to our office and pick up some copies. I bid farewell to everyone and thought I would see them in an hour or less. I headed down the elevator. The elevator stopped at the floor below the Windows on the World. It was Cantor Fitzgerald’s office. One gentleman got on the elevator, another stood there in the hallway, discussing something with him. I’ll never forget his face.
Dan Potter: I drove over to Staten Island. I remember going into the American Legion Hall. You got your study material for the lieutenant’s exam and then you went and sat at a desk. You had an hour to do usually 50 questions.
Joe Massian, technology consultant, Port Authority, North Tower: I was working on floor 70. I remember sitting at my desk for a minute with my backpack on. After about five or ten minutes—this is probably about 8:30 a.m.—I decided to take my backpack off and lay it on my desk.
David Kravette: I had a meeting at eight o’clock. They’re running late. At 8:40, I get a call from the [ground-floor] lobby: “Your visitors are here.” One of the guys came without a wallet, no ID at all. Someone had to go down and sign for him. There was a girl who sat behind me, a desk assistant who was very helpful, but she was eight-and-a-half-months pregnant. I said to myself, I’m not going to make her go down. I went downstairs. I see my client. I go, “Which one of you knuckleheads forgot your ID?”
Joseph Lott was scheduled to speak at the Risk Waters conference at Windows on the World. He spent the night of the 10th at the Marriott Hotel between the two towers, known as Three World Trade Center.
Joseph Lott, sales representative, Compaq Computers: The shirt I was going to wear—a white shirt—was pretty wrinkled from laying in the suitcase, so I put on a green shirt. I went down to breakfast. My colleague Elaine Greenberg was there. We sat and had breakfast, and we went over some changes to the slides. She said that she had gone to a vacation home in Massachusetts, and while she was there she saw a tie and bought it for me. It was a stunning tie. I said, “This is such a nice gesture—I’m going to put this on.” She said, “Well, not with that shirt. You’re not going to put on a red and blue tie with a green shirt.” As we left the restaurant at the Marriott, I said, “I’m going to go back and change and put on that white shirt. It will look better with this tie. Go on ahead without me.”
I set up an ironing board and ironed the white shirt. I put that shirt on with my new tie. As I was waiting to go from the seventh floor back down to the lobby, I felt a sudden movement in the building.
Jared Kotz: I walked into the office and called my London colleagues to let them know that everything but one box had arrived. I could see the time was 8:46. I remember thinking, Gee, I have plenty of time to get back downtown before the event starts. I was talking to one of my colleagues in London when I heard the plane go over.
The drama of September 11th began not in New York but in the skies over Massachusetts. That morning, 92 people—11 crew joined by 81 passengers—boarded American Airlines Flight 11, scheduled to fly nonstop from Boston’s Logan Airport to Los Angeles International Airport. At 7:59 a.m., its pilot, Capt. John Ogonowski, accelerated down the runway and launched his Boeing 767 into the sky. Among the 81 passengers were five men set on ensuring Flight 11 never made it to its destination.
Sixteen minutes later, on another Logan runway, Capt. Victor Saracini also accelerated his plane, United Airlines Flight 175, another Boeing 767, scheduled nonstop to Los Angeles. He and First Officer Michael Horrocks were carrying a light load that day, just 65 people—9 crew and 56 passengers—including, again, five hijackers.
Over the next 32 minutes, both planes were hijacked and flown toward New York, confusing air traffic controllers.
The final routine transmission from American Airlines Flight 11 came just 10 minutes into its flight.
AA11: Boston Center, good morning, American 11 with you passing through one-niner-zero for two-three-zero.
Boston Sector: American 11, Boston Center, roger, climb, maintain level two-eight-zero.
Shortly after American Airlines Flight 11 made its final normal transmission, it ceased responding to air traffic control. Garbled radio messages and frantic telephone calls from passengers and crew spread word of the drama above.
Boston Sector: American 11, turn 20 degrees right.
AA11: Turning right, American 11.
Boston Sector: American 11, climb, maintain flight level three-five-zero.
Boston Sector: American 11, climb, maintain flight level three-five-zero?
Boston Sector: American 11, Boston?
Boston Sector: American one-one—the American on the frequency—how do you hear me?
Boston Sector: American 11, if you hear Boston Center, ident?
About 20 minutes after takeoff, and just minutes after the hijacking, Betty Ong, a 45-year-old flight attendant aboard American Airlines Flight 11, used an in-seat AT&T air-phone to call the airline’s reservations line, reaching agent Winston Sadler at American’s Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina. The call would last 25 minutes. Ong had chosen to fly on Flight 11 that day so she could meet her sister to plan their trip to Hawaii for the following week.
Betty Ong: Um, the cockpit’s not answering. Somebody’s stabbed in business class, and, um, I think there is Mace—that we can’t breathe. I don’t know, I think we’re getting hijacked.
Winston Sadler: Which flight are you on?
Betty Ong: Flight 12.I
Winston Sadler: And what seat are you in? [Silence] Ma’am, are you there?
Betty Ong: Yes.
Winston Sadler: What seat are you in? [Silence] Ma’am, what seat are you in?
Betty Ong: We just left Boston, we’re up in the air.
Winston Sadler: I know.
Betty Ong: We’re supposed to go to L.A. and the cockpit’s not answering their phone. . . .
Winston Sadler: OK, but what seat are you sitting in? What’s the number of your seat?
Betty Ong: OK. I’m in the jump seat right now. That’s 3R.
Winston Sadler: OK. Are you the flight attendant? I’m sorry, did you say you’re the flight attendant?
Betty Ong: Hello?
Winston Sadler: Hello, what is your name?
Betty Ong: Hi, you’re gonna have to speak up. I can’t hear you.
Winston Sadler: What is your name?
Betty Ong: OK, my name is Betty Ong. I’m Number 3 on Flight 11.
Winston Sadler: OK.
Betty Ong: The cockpit is not answering their phone and there’s somebody stabbed in business class and there’s—we can’t breathe in business class. Somebody’s got Mace or something.
Winston Sadler: Can you describe the person, that you said someone is, what, in business class?
Betty Ong: I’m sitting in the back. Somebody’s coming back from business. If you can hold on for one second, they’re coming back. [Inaudible] Anyone know who stabbed who?
Unidentified flight attendant: [Inaudible] I don’t know, but Karen and Bobby got stabbed.
Betty Ong [back to Sadler]: Our, our Number 1 [flight attendant] got stabbed. Our purser is stabbed. Ah, nobody knows who stabbed who and we can’t even get up to business class right now because nobody can breathe. Our Number 1 is, is stabbed right now. And our Number 5. Our first-class passenger that, ah first ah class galley flight attendant and our purser has been stabbed and we can’t get to the cockpit, the door won’t open. Hello?
Winston Sadler: Yeah, I’m taking it down, all the information. We’re also, you know, of course, recording this, um, at this point?
Realizing the severity of the situation, Sadler then followed protocol and patched the call from Flight 11 in to American Airlines operations agent Nydia Gonzalez, connecting the three of them together.
Nydia Gonzalez: This is operations. What flight number are we talking about?
Winston Sadler: Flight 12.
Nydia Gonzalez: Flight 12, OK.
Betty Ong: No, we’re on Flight 11 right now. This is Flight 11.
Winston Sadler: This is Flight 11. I’m sorry, Nydia.
Betty Ong: Boston to Los Angeles.
Winston Sadler: Yes.
Betty Ong [to Sadler]: Our Number 1 has been stabbed, and our 5 has been stabbed. [To her fellow passengers:] Can anybody get up to the cockpit? Can anybody get up to the cockpit? [To Sadler:] We can’t even get into the cockpit. We don’t know who’s up there.
Winston Sadler: Well if they were shrewd, they would keep the door closed, and—
Betty Ong: I’m sorry?
Winston Sadler: Would they not maintain a sterile cockpit?
Betty Ong: I think the guys are up there. They might have gone there—jammed their way up there, or something. Nobody can call the cockpit. We can’t even get inside.
[Silence]
Betty Ong: Is anybody still there?
Winston Sadler: Yes, we’re still here.
Betty Ong: OK. I’m staying on the line as well.
Winston Sadler: OK.
While Winston Sadler stayed on the line with Betty Ong, Nydia Gonzalez used a second line to call American Airlines’ Systems Operations Center, where she reached manager Craig Marquis and relayed word of the hijacking. The recording of this second telephone call, with Marquis, does not capture Ong’s side of the conversation, where she relayed additional information to Gonzalez.
Craig Marquis: American Airlines emergency line, please state your emergency.
Nydia Gonzalez: Hey, this is Nydia at American Airlines calling, I am monitoring a call in which Flight 11, the flight attendant, is advising our reps that the pilot, everyone’s been stabbed.
Craig Marquis: Flight 11?
Nydia Gonzalez: Yeah. They can’t get into the cockpit is what I’m hearing. . . .
Craig Marquis: OK, uh, uh, I’m assuming they’ve declared an emergency? Let me get [air traffic control] on here, stand by. . . .
Nydia Gonzalez: OK.
Craig Marquis: Anything else from this flight attendant?
Nydia Gonzalez: Uh, so far what I’ve gotten: the Number 5 flight attendant’s been stabbed, but she seems to be breathing. The Number 1 seems to be stabbed pretty badly, she’s lying down on the floor, they don’t know if she is conscious or not. The other flight attendants are in the back. And that’s as far as I know. It seems like the passengers in coach might not be aware of what’s going on.
Craig Marquis: These two passengers were from first class?
Nydia Gonzalez [back to Ong]: Hey, Betty? Do you know any information as far as the [inaudible] of the men there in the cockpit with the pilots? Were they from first class? [Back to Marquis:] They were sitting in 2A and B. They are in the cockpit with the pilots.
Craig Marquis: Who’s helping them? Is there a doctor on board?
Nydia Gonzalez [to Ong]: Is there a doctor on board, Betty, that’s assisting you guys? You don’t have any doctors on board. OK. So you’ve gotten all the first-class passengers out of first class?
Craig Marquis: Have they taken everyone out of first class?
Nydia Gonzalez [to Marquis]: Yeah, she’s just saying that they have. They’re in coach. What’s going on, honey? OK, the aircraft is erratic again. Flying very erratically. She did say that all the first-class passengers have been moved back to coach, so the first-class cabin is empty. What’s going on on your end, Craig?
Craig Marquis: We contacted air traffic control. They are going to handle this as a confirmed hijacking, so they’re moving all the traffic out of this aircraft’s way.
Nydia Gonzalez: OK.
Craig Marquis: He turned his transponder off, so we don’t have a definitive altitude for him. We’re just going by—they seem to think that they have him on a primary radar. They seem to think that he is descending. . . .
Nydia Gonzalez: What’s going on, Betty? Betty, talk to me. Betty, are you there? Betty? [Inaudible] Do you think we lost her? OK, so we’ll like—we’ll stay open. We—I think we might have lost her.
Back in Boston, air traffic controllers received what appeared to be a call from Flight 11, as the cockpit microphone was keyed three times. They later realized that the hijackers apparently had tried to speak over the intercom to the passengers on board but instead used the air traffic control frequency.
Boston Sector: Is that American 11 trying to call?
Mohamed Atta, hijacker: [Indistinct noise] We have some planes. Just stay quiet and we’ll be OK. We are returning to the airport.
Boston Sector: And, uh, who’s trying to call me, here? American 11, are you trying to call?
Mohamed Atta: Nobody move, everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves, you will injure yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.
Following the confusing radio call, air traffic controllers conferred among themselves to figure out what was transpiring. Boston air traffic control contacted other controllers who oversaw planes at higher altitudes, a post known as Athens 38, who might have had radio contact with Flight 11.
Unknown Boston air traffic controller: Hey, 38?
Athens Sector 38: Yes.
Unknown Boston air traffic controller: You guys heard anything from American?
Athens Sector 38: No.
Unknown Boston air traffic controller: OK, we think there might be somebody in the cockpit right now taking it over.
Mohamed Atta [to passengers aboard Flight 11]: Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don’t try to make any stupid moves.
Fearing the worst, air traffic controllers asked for local fighter aircraft to intercept and escort the flight, the standard protocol at the time for hijackings.
Cape Cod, Massachusetts, air traffic control: Cape Approach.
Dan Bueno, air traffic control, Boston Sector: Hey Cape, ah, Dan Bueno calling from Boston Center. Hey, we’ve got a situation with American 11, a possible hijack.
Cape Cod air traffic control: American 11?
Dan Bueno: Yes sir, departed Boston going to LAX. Right now he’s out to Albany. Like to scramble some fighters to go tail him.
Cape Cod air traffic control: Well, OK. Well, we’ll talk to Otis [Air Force Base] here.
Nydia Gonzalez [to Craig Marquis]: They think they might have a fatality on the flight. One of our passengers, possibly in 9B, Levin or Lewis, might have been fatally stabbed.
Still not fully understanding the situation on board American Airlines 11 but realizing it was grave, FAA Boston Center alerted a military unit known as the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), part of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). That morning, NORAD had scheduled its biggest annual exercise—a scenario aimed at repelling a Russian nuclear attack—that added to the confusion as military bases and commanders across the country struggled to comprehend what was real and what was part of the exercise.
Joseph Cooper, air traffic control, Boston Center: Hi, Boston Center, TMU [Traffic Management Unit], we have, ah, a problem here, we have a hijacked aircraft headed toward New—New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there to help us out.
Sgt. Jeremy Powell, Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Rome, New York: Is this real-world or exercise?
Joseph Cooper: No. This is not an exercise, not a test.
Air traffic control called United Flight 175, the other Boston-to-Los Angeles flight, which had taken off at 8:15 a.m. and was a few miles behind American Airlines Flight 11, to warn it about the hijacking. The flight crew responded normally.
New York Center: OK, United 175, you have him at your 12 o’clock, now five, 10 miles.
United Airlines Flight 175: Affirmative, we have him. He looks about 20, say about 29, 28 thousand [feet].
New York Center: OK, thank you. United 175 [Indistinct] turn 30 degrees to the right, I want to keep you away from this traffic.
United Airlines Flight 175: Thirty degrees to the right, United 175, heavy.
Shortly after, NEADS called Otis Air Force Base on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and ordered two alert pilots to scramble to intercept American Airlines Flight 11.
Sgt. Jeremy Powell, Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Rome, New York: This is Huntress placing Panta four-five, four-six on battle stations—I repeat battle stations—time one-two-four-one [1241 Greenwich Mean Time, 8:41 a.m. ET]. Authenticate Hotel Romeo, all parties acknowledge with initials. Command Post.
American Airlines 11 flight attendant Madeline “Amy” Sweeney, filling in for a sick colleague aboard the hijacked plane, placed a telephone call to the American Airlines Flight Services Office at Logan Airport. She spoke with services manager Michael Woodward, who was also a friend.
Madeline “Amy” Sweeney, American Airlines 11 flight attendant: The flight has been hijacked. This flight is Flight 11 from Boston to L.A. The plane is a 767. I am in the back with Betty Ong, AA flight attendant. A man in business class has had his throat slashed and is presumably dead. Number 1 flight attendant has been stabbed and Number 5 flight attendant has been stabbed. There is a bomb in the cockpit. I can’t make contact with the cockpit, can you do it? We have paged for a doctor or nurse for the flight attendants. The coach passengers don’t know what’s happening.
The hijackers are of Middle Eastern descent. One spoke good English and one didn’t.
It is a rapid descent. Something is wrong. I don’t think the captain is in control.
I see water.
I see buildings.
We’re flying low.
We’re flying very, very low.
Oh my God.
We’re flying way too low.
I. In her panic, Ong gave the wrong flight number.
As the hijackings began on the East Coast, civilian air traffic controllers at the FAA struggled to comprehend the sudden and unprecedented threat to the 4,000 airplanes still in the air. As they rushed to contact and scramble fighter aircraft from Otis Air Force Base in Massachusetts and Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, military units in charge of the nation’s air defense confronted a threat they’d never imagined: an attack coming not from outside the U.S. but from within its own borders. A decade after the end of the Cold War, they found the tools at their disposal scattered and insufficient. Caught off guard, they improvised a response.
After American Airlines Flight 11 initially checked in with air traffic controller Peter Zalewski, the first warning that something had happened in the air came when the pilots ceased to respond to radio calls.
Peter Zalewski, air traffic controller, Boston Center, Nashua, New Hampshire: When American Airlines Flight 11 came to me, the pilot said, “Boston Center, this is American 11, climbing to flight level two-three-zero.”
I called him many, many times: “American 11, how do you hear? American 11, this is Boston Center. Do you hear me?” I’m calling and calling, and I’m like, My God! Maybe they’re drinking Dunkin’ Donuts coffee up there. Honestly, that’s what I was thinking. Then there’s these transmissions. The first transmission from the aircraft, it’s garbled to me. I don’t understand it. Then there was a second one—a voice. I remember him saying, “Nobody move, please. We’re going back to the airport.” I will never forget that feeling up the back of my neck. It was like this adrenaline or something. I felt fear. I’m like, Oh, my God! The plane’s being hijacked.
Colin Scoggins, airspace and procedures specialist and military specialist, FAA, Boston Center: I came in at about 8:25 in the morning, and as soon as I walked to the front door someone came to me and said that there was a hijack going on. We’d worked hijacks in the past, and they were usually uneventful.
Peter Zalewski: I yell at [the supervisor]: “John, get over here. This plane is being hijacked—absolutely.” I go, “It’s Middle Eastern voices—positive.” I could tell by the second time—I was used to working Egypt Air, Saudi, Turkish, all of them: “It’s Middle Eastern voices.”
Colin Scoggins: Mohamed Atta, the pilot on American 11, the lead terrorist, stated something about “more planes,” that they had more planes. It was definitely plural. That’s when things really started to ramp up.
Ben Sliney, national operations manager, FAA Command Center, Herndon, Virginia: I was the national operations manager on 9/11. That is a position located in the Washington area that has overarching authority over the nation’s airspace. That was my charge: the safe and efficient operation of the nation’s airspace.
Col. Bob Marr, commander, NEADS, Rome, New York: There was a huddle of people around one of the radar scopes. I saw that huddle and thought, There’s got to be something wrong.
Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold, commander of the 1st Air Force, NORAD, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida: We had a major North American Air Defense exercise that morning, a command post exercise. There was a team of people that introduced scenarios that you have to react to and respond to. As we were winding up the [exercise] briefing my executive officer, Lt. Col. Kelley Duckett, handed me a slip of paper. Bob Marr had called and said there was a hijacking in the Boston Center Area.
Ben Sliney: My experience with hijackings—and our protocol—was that we cooperate.
Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins, mission crew commander, NEADS, Rome, New York: At this point our mind-set was the 1970s-vintage hijack. We didn’t have a huge concern this aircraft was going to crash.
Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold: I said, “Bob, go ahead and scramble the aircraft.”
Maj. Joe McGrady, F-15 pilot, Otis Air Force Base, Cape Cod, Massachusetts: A scramble order was issued. I ran to our jets. I started up. We realized we did not have any weapons. They filled up our jets with gas. Even though we were “Winchester”—which means we had no weapons—we took off.
Lt. Col. Tim Duffy, F-15 pilot, Otis Air Force Base, Cape Cod, Massachusetts: When we took off, I left it in full afterburner the whole time. We were supersonic going down to Long Island, and my wingman, “Nasty” [Maj. Dan Nash], called and said, “Hey Duff, you’re super,” and I said, “Yeah, I know, don’t worry about it.” I wanted to get there.
Col. Bob Marr: At Mach One, it would take them 16 minutes to get there—that’s 10 miles a minute.
Lt. Col. Kevin Nasypany, mission crew commander, NEADS, Rome, New York: Almost simultaneously, we brought in more surveillance technicians to look at the scope.
Staff Sgt. Larry Thornton, NEADS: The area was so congested, the hijacked flight was incredibly difficult to find. We were looking for little dash marks in a pile of clutter on a two-dimensional scope.
Master Sgt. Joe McCain, NEADS: We picked up a search track going down the Hudson Valley, straight in from the north toward New York. The plane was fast and heading in an unusual direction with no beacon [transponder]. We watched that track until it faded over New York City.
Lt. Gen. Tom Keck, commander, Barksdale Air Force Base, Shreveport, Louisiana: We were in the midst of this big annual exercise called GLOBAL GUARDIAN. They loaded all the bombers, put the submarines out to sea, put the ICBMs at nearly 100 percent. It was routine, you did it every year. A captain said, “Sir, we had an aircraft hit the World Trade Center.” I started to correct him, saying, “When you have an exercise input you have to start by saying, ‘I have an exercise input.’ That way it doesn’t get confused with the real world.” Then he pointed me to the TV screens in the command center. You could see smoke pouring out of the building. Like everyone else in aviation that day, I thought, How in a clear-and-a-million day could someone hit the World Trade Center?